How does the development of financial markets change the interaction between banks and corporations? This paper compares the importance of interlocking boards of directors between corporations and banks in Brazil, Mexico and the United States circa 1909. The hypothesis tested is that the development of financial markets and the institutions that accompany it (e.g. financial disclosure rules, investor protections, etc) allows corporations to rely less on connections to banks. There are two specific hypotheses tested in this work. First, given the development of disclosure and corporate governance standards in Brazil, I expect bankers to have been less central than in Mexico and, perhaps, the United States. Second, I test if the availability of financing alternatives, like a well developed bond market in Brazil, reduced the average importance of corporate connections to commercial banks compared to Mexico. I test these hypotheses using network analysis and a simple multivariate regression that explains bank connections. I use comparable business directories to create databases with names of directors and financial information for all major corporations in Mexico and Brazil in 1909. The findings show that using different centrality measures, connections between banks and corporations were less important in Brazil than in Mexico and the United States. Also, in Brazil, the availability of bonds as a way to obtain financing allowed corporations to have a lower average number of connections to banks when compared to their Mexican counterparts. In Mexico, foreign companies, which had access to financial markets abroad, had also lower average connections with banks. I conclude by arguing that even though the Brazil, Mexico and the U.S. had very different network structures, rapid industrial growth was achieved by these three countries. In Mexico, a strong and dense network replaced for some of the institutions that promoted financial development and growth in Brazil.
I. Introduction
What is the role of networks of interlocking boards of directors under different institutional settings? How does the development of financial markets change the interaction between banks and corporations? To answer these questions, this paper explores the relationships of bankers and corporations in Brazil, Mexico, and to a lesser extent, the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.
There is no consensus on the role of ties between banks and corporations for the process of economic development. According to some studies, close relations between banks and corporations aid economic growth by improving access to capital for companies and reducing monitoring costs for banks. The idea is that having a close relation with financial intermediaries can reduce information asymmetries, improve monitoring of managerial decisions, and ultimately provide banks with more capacity to enforce loan contracts (Aoki, 1990; Diamond, 1984; Lamoreaux, 1994) . Moreover, having close ties to a bank may guarantee access to funding during a crisis for related corporations (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990) .
But in some cases, close relations between corporations and banks are only favorable to the latter. When bankers develop close ties to firms, they might be the only ones with information about the past behavior of their clients. Therefore, these banks might have a better idea of the cash flows of their customers and their past behavior as borrowers. With this private information, banks can "extract the rents attributable to knowing that the borrower is less risky" (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, p. 6) . In other words, a related banker might be better able to evaluate risky projects than a distant lender (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2001) . Therefore, banks have the incentives to capture "most of the rents that client firms may enjoy due to their access to capital and thereby push down firm profits" (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998, p. 639 ).
While there is no consensus on the benefits of bankers and corporations having close relations, there is evidence that these relations weaken when firms have more options to finance. Since the late 1980s, there are at least two documented cases where this has occurred: in Japan and the United States. In Japan, where close bank-firm relationships have been pervasive since World War II, the opening of financial markets at the end of the 1980s provided companies with other sources of funds, such as nonsecured bonds. This debilitated the relationship between banks and companies and allowed risktaking companies to grow faster than those that stayed linked to banks (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) .
In the same way, in the United States, where close relations between banks and companies have been a common feature of the economy since at least 1904, Davis and Mizruchi (1999) have identified a major change after the financial liberalization of the late 1980s. These authors argue that when companies were faced with more financing options, such as commercial paper, the relationship with bankers became less necessary.
In their work, Davis and Mizruchi document the declining number of corporate board interlocks with banks from 1980 to 1994 and explain how financial development weakened these ties.
This paper explores the structure of relations between banks and corporations in
Brazil in 1909 from a comparative perspective. I argue that financial development and other institutional features of the Brazilian economy made corporations less dependent on bank relations than in other countries such as Mexico and the United States.
This hypothesis comes from the idea that there are trade-offs between financial market development and the creation of ties between corporations and banks. The logic is as follows: When corporations operate in markets with significant asymmetries of information, costly monitoring, and weak enforcement of contracts, they may seek to organize in groups or networks in order to reduce transaction costs, exchange information, and improve contract enforcement. In fact, in this context, contract reneging by group members can be prevented by the threat of group retaliation, expulsion, and other punishments. 1 Therefore, in an environment with weak enforcement of financial contracts, poor information disclosure, and weak corporate governance, the personal relationships that corporate managers have with financial intermediaries can be crucial to accessing outside finance. Such relationships can take the form of interlocking boards of directors between banks and corporations.
There are three main reasons bankers would sit on corporate boards of directors.
First, interlocking boards of directors can enhance access to capital for firms and reduce monitoring costs for banks. If the enforcement of contracts is poor and obtaining information about borrowers too costly, banks will prefer to lend to the companies related to them. Lending to insiders is a way for banks to reduce asymmetries of information and monitoring costs. In the same way, corporations might be interested in having a board interlock with banks if credit is scarce and there are limited substitutes for it (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Diamond, 1984; Aoki, 1990; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2004; Lamoreaux, 1994) .
Second, having bankers on the board of directors of a company might work as a certification mechanism. Bankers can sit on corporate boards of directors as a way to guarantee investors that the company is going to perform and pay dividends or bond coupons on time. This was common in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, when investment bankers sat on the boards of companies for which they underwrote securities (Carosso, 1970) . Having a banker might also signal other lenders that a company is creditworthy (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) .
Finally, companies might want to have bankers on their boards to obtain financial advice. Commercial bankers could sit on corporate boards of corporations that needed debt restructuring or wanted to change their financial structure (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2003 between banks and corporations relationships in order to reduce asymmetries of information will be less necessary. In these instances, the role of bankers might be reduced to certification or advice only.
Brazil had relatively developed equity and debt markets at the turn of the twentieth century. Economic historians have argued Brazil had strong institutional settings between 1890 and 1930 that favored the creation of joint stock companies and the expansion of bond and equity markets (Haber, 1998 , Hanley, 2005 , and Musacchio, 2005 (Musacchio, 2005) .
If the institutional settings of Brazil truly promoted the development of financial markets, with the participation of small investors, with good disclosure policies, and with strong enforcement of contracts, then we would not expect to find intermediaries, such as commercial bankers, playing the role of market makers. This is especially true given that the few Brazilian investment banks disappeared before 1905. Therefore, we would not expect commercial bankers to have been too important in brokering information, relations, and credit. Even more, we would not expect to find that commercial banks were at the center of the network of corporate interlocks during this period.
Brazil today is a country viewed as a typical case in which business groups play important roles to overcome information and monitoring problems. Many of these groups have strong ties to financial institutions that facilitate access to credit. 4 Moreover, the literature on groups sees Brazil as a country with a "variety of market failures, caused by information and agency problems" (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) . Finally, Brazil, a Civil Law country, is ranked among the worst in terms of financial development, creditor rights, and investor rights enforcement as of 1995 (La Porta et al, 1998) .
I compare Brazil to Mexico and the United States circa 1910 because those are two countries in which bankers have been identified as important actors. In the United
States, interlocks of corporations with banks, especially investment banks, worked as signaling and monitoring mechanisms that guaranteed shareholders and bondholders their investments were protected (Carosso, 1970) . Mizruchi (1982) , testing a somewhat different hypothesis, found that banks were very central in the network of corporate interlocks.
at the Diario Official, the federal government's official gazette. These balances usually included a summary of the profit and loss statement, integrated into the liability side, and a detailed description of assets, capital accounts and short and long-term liabilities. 4 In fact, the first work to theorize about the role of business groups in developing countries was done by a Brazilianist, who used his knowledge of Brazil in the 1970s as the basis of his theory. According to this work, business groups were a form of industrial organization that helped companies to overcome information and contractual problems (Leff, 1978) .
On the other hand, in Mexico there is evidence that banks tended to lend to related parties because of the high asymmetries in information and the discretionary nature of legal mechanisms to enforce contracts. The importance of networks to improve contract enforcement and monitoring has been explored for the period 1876 in Maurer (2003 ) and for 1940 -1980 in Del Angel (2002 . These works have found that in Mexico interlocks between banks and corporations have positively affected contract enforcement.
Del Angel (2002) The comparison to the United States is done using the data available in Mizruchi (1982) . Mizruchi (1982) shows that out of the top 15 corporations, five were banks.
One could argue that the differences I find between the networks of Brazil and say Mexico are a product of the geographical dispersion of the network. In a large country, such as Brazil, we would not expect to find very close and dense networks of entrepreneurs and bankers. On the other hand, in a country like Mexico, with a tradition of political centralization we would expect to find a dense network of relations around banks in the capital of the country. However, the evidence does not support this claim for two main reasons. First, population density was higher in the cities of Brazil than in Mexico and still the density of the network in Brazil was lower. Second, geographic distance does not seem to have created a dispersed structure for the Brazilian network of corporate interlocks because companies were not clustered by geographic regions. On the contrary the network of interlocks shows companies from different states interacting through interlocks. In fact, banks were, in many instances, important bridges between the companies of these different regions.
Finally, I also test the hypothesis that companies that had access to substitutes of bank credit, such as corporate bonds, would tend to have fewer commercial bankers on their boards, both in Brazil and Mexico. The test is done using a simple multivariate regression model. This model studies the impact that having access to other sources of financing (such as access to foreign financial markets or to the issue of corporate bonds) had on the average number of bank connections per company. Specifically, we would expect that companies that had access to foreign financial markets or that issued bonds would have less bank connections on average than their competitors. The regression results show that for the case of Brazil having access to bond markets implied companies had lower average connections to banks. For Mexico, companies with access to foreign capital and foreign financial markets had on average fewer connections with banks too. In this country, companies that had high bond to equity ratios actually tended to have more bank connections. But once we control for the fact that most companies issuing bonds were foreign, we find that access to foreign financial markets to issue equity or bonds actually came together with a lower average number of interlocks with banks. This paper is divided into five parts. Part II explains why the comparison between Brazil, Mexico, and the United States is relevant for the hypotheses I am testing. Part III explains the data and methodology used for the paper. Part IV presents the main findings, and Part V concludes.
II.
Bankers and the Financial System in Brazil, Mexico, and the
United States circa 1909

Bankers as Market Makers: The Case of the United States
It has been documented that investment bankers played the role of market makers in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Financial markets in this country were relatively developed by international standards (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , but access to capital for big corporations did not work on an impersonal basis. This period is commonly know as the era of the "Robber Barons" or of "financial capitalism."
According to Carosso (1970) , one characteristic of large corporations during this period, is that they shared their boards of directors with investment bankers as a way to access external financing. These bankers had the capacity to sell large amounts of equity and bonds to their customers in Europe and the United States. The guarantee investment banks offered to bond and equity buyers was that they would be closely involved in the business they were underwriting, watching and manipulating managerial decisions through positions on the board of directors.
In most deals, investment bankers, such as J.P. Morgan, had as their primary concern the protection of "the interests of investors and [their] own." For example, in the case of railroads, the investors of J.P. Morgan "held him accountable for the prosperity of the roads he endorsed, an obligation that Morgan accepted seriously, and he expected the managers of these lines to exercise a similar responsibility toward him." The way to achieve this was by naming a "man he considered prudent" as director of the venture for which he was selling securities (Carosso, 1970, p.38) .
Another important problem for investors in the United States during the Robber
Barons era was that manufacturing companies did not commonly disclose financial information. According to a study of company disclosure practices at the turn of the twentieth century, "so secretive were some manufacturing companies that even into the twentieth century they failed to make available to investors any financial information other than the company's capitalization and dividend records" (Hawkins, 1963, p. 135 ).
According to Carosso (1970) , "Few manufacturers before 1900 considered it necessary or advisable to issue regular operating statements and balance sheets; and, those that did, too often published reports that either were incomplete or, because of the absence of standard accounting practices, were of 'dubious value'" (p. 44). Even more, "not only was there inadequate financial disclosure, but some companies were irregular in the frequency with which they issued reports." In fact, "between 1897 and 1905, the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company neither published an annual financial report to its stockholders, nor held an annual meeting" (Hawkins, 1963, p. 137) .
This is why investment bankers also helped to solve these information problems.
For example, many companies controlled by investment bankers, or that wanted to trade securities, developed better financial disclosure systems. Some of the most detailed reports after 1900 were from companies such as American Tobacco, Continental
Tobacco, General Electric, National Biscuit Company, and Federal Steel Company, some of which were under the control of investment bankers.
5
With a prevalent lack of financial information, the promoters of securities needed strong reputations in order to sell. Many investors in the United States bought securities based on their confidence in the promoters or investment bankers that offered the issue. It was believed that investment bankers endorsed issues of securities only after investigating the securities deeply and then guaranteeing the issues through their control of the company. Interlocks between investment bankers and corporations in this context also allowed the former to access financial information that was restricted to the public and helped to solve information asymmetries. According to Hawkins (1963) , "few buyers and apparently fewer sellers [of securities] were disturbed by the absence of financial statements" (p. 143).
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Therefore, in the case of the United States, investment bankers did work as market makers. That is why we would expect the United States to have been a place where bankers were central to the network of corporate board interlocks. Mizruchi (1982) undertook the task of mapping the network of corporate interlocks around 1904 and found that among the most central companies there were many banks.
Insider Lending: Bank ties to Corporations in Mexico
In Mexico, economic historians have agreed that relationships between corporations and banks were common. These relations helped corporations to access capital and banks to reduce information asymmetries and enforce credit contracts. For example, Maurer and Sharma (2001) argue that one reason for the strong connections between companies and banks in Mexico was the poor protection of property rights. This was because, in Mexico, it was hard to repossess collateral in case of default, thus banks and firms developed business groups that allowed close monitoring of corporate activities and helped to enforce credit contracts.
Close relationships between banks and corporations were even more important because of the lack of financing options. In Mexico, market entry for banks was complicated, and there were only a handful of banks lending. According to Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003, p.87) , bank entry in Mexico during the Porfirian period encountered five main obstacles. First, bankers needed charter approval by the minister of finance (who at the same time was a stockholder and director of many banks). Second, there was a high minimum capitalization to get a charter (approximately US $125,000, later raised to US $250,000). Third, given the prohibitive taxes on notes issued by second-comer banks, only the first state banks to charter were able to successfully issue notes, which limited entry to further competition (Maurer, 2003 The limited number of banks in Mexico was a problem for companies looking for financing because connections were needed to access credit. 7 The most common way to get loans from banks was by having connections that would help to roll over short-term loans (Ludlow and Marichal, 1986) . Gomez-Galvarriato (1999) , in her study of CIVSA, the largest cotton mill in Mexico during the Porfiriato, found that "reports given in the board meeting's minutes indicate that bank credit was … provided through short-term loans, [thus] it did not appear in the annual balance sheets" (p. 121). Thus, relationships with bankers were very important for companies that depended on banking credit.
Also in Mexico around 1909, connections were needed to protect property rights.
According to Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) , the protection of property rights for businesses in Mexico depended on the "vertical political integration" of the government and investors. In this view, government officials and businessmen partnered to distribute privileges and to enforce property rights by selectively giving concessions to and protecting the property of parties that shared rents with the political brokers. Thus, in the Mexican system, contract enforcement depended more on connections than on the general application of legal principles. This affected the way in which companies had to relate to the financial system in dramatic ways. Therefore, in Mexico we would expect to find bankers as central actors in the network of corporate interlocks. Given the limited options that corporations had to obtain financing, we would expect to find many companies establishing interlocks with banks.
Brazil: Markets vs. Banks
The comparison of Brazil to Mexico and the United States is relevant for two reasons. First, in Brazil corporations had options other than banks to obtain financing in the domestic market, something that was harder in Mexico. Second, in contrast with the United States, there is evidence showing that in Brazil the institutional environment protected shareholders and creditors.
The institutions that fomented the participation of investors holding small lots of stock included a system of financial information disclosure. This system, one could argue, was more complete than the one prevalent in the United States at that time.
Brazilian laws required corporations issuing debentures to file semiannually and all companies to issue reports annually.
Disclosure of corporate accounts in Brazil was not only regular but detailed. A survey of textile mill financial statements compiled by Haber (1991) shows detailed balance sheets published semiannually at the Diario Official, the federal government's official publication. These balances usually included a summary of the profit and loss statement integrated into the liability side and a detailed description of assets, capital accounts, and short-and long-term liabilities.
Corporations relied on debentures and equity intensively to obtain financing in Brazil, which helps to explain why banks did not actively financed industrialization. By the early twentieth century corporations were issuing small amounts of bonds to finance short-and medium-term operations on a regular basis. Also, the studies by Triner (2000) and Hanely (1995) 
III. Methodology
This paper is divided into two tests. Betweenness is not always optimal because it gives too much weigh to the bridging power of an actor, even if she is unconnected to important people or many people directly.
Bonacich centrality iteratively takes into account an actor's connections and those of actors directly related to her. So, this is a measure that "weights interlock ties according to the interlock partner's number of ties such that sharing a director with a firm whose other directors serve on many boards is weighted more heavily that sharing a director with a firm with few ties" (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999, 227 Bonacich and degree centrality data are also presented for the United States.
These data were obtained from the study that Mizruchi (1982) 
Financing options and bank connections
Operationalizing a test of the impact of available financing options on the importance of bank connections per company is not easy. That is why I use two proxies.
First, in Brazil and Mexico I found some companies with access to bond markets. In Brazil, the bond market was very developed around 1909. A majority of the firms registered at the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange were issuing bonds in large amounts. In Mexico, the corporate bond market did not exist. It was not even regulated. Thus, corporations issuing bonds were usually foreign. Access to foreign capital markets allowed some companies in Mexico to access other financing options.
I created two tests. For the case of Brazil I explore whether companies that had access to the bond market had a lower number of interlocks with banks. This is a reasonable test because the databases for Brazil and Mexico include only commercial banks, so the argument that having a commercial banker on the board of directors of a company could increase its bond issues does not necessarily apply. In fact, Davis and Mizruchi (1999, p. 219) argue that "corporations with investment bankers on the board 9 More detailed explanations of these centrality measures and their estimation procedure can be found in Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Scott (1991) . are more likely to issue bonds, whereas firms with commercial bankers on the board are likely to take on short-term debt." I test whether access to bond markets reduced the number of commercial bankers on the boards of corporations, on average, using the following model:
Num. of Bank Connections i = age i + log (equity) i + sector dummy i + (debenture/equity) i
where i denotes each company in the sample, age is the number of years since the company was established, log (equity) is the natural logarithm of the social capital declared by the company in the Brazilian Yearbook 1909, and sector dummies are a series of variables that capture differences by sectors. 10 Finally, I include a measure of alternative financing options, which is the debenture-to-paid-up capital ratio (I call it debenture-equity ratio for simplicity). The hypothesis tested is that companies that had the possibility to issue more debentures, as a proportion of their paid up capital, would have less bank connections on average.
For Mexico, the same test is replicated with one caveat. Since in Mexico only foreign companies had access to other financing options, I test whether being a foreign company reduced the dependence on connections with domestic bankers. Moreover, I test whether being a foreign company and issuing debentures comes hand in hand with a lower number of connections in general. For Brazil, the inclusion of a dummy variable for foreign companies yielded no significant results.
The test for Mexico is performed using a model that includes the following changes:
Y i = age i + log (equity) i + sector dummy i + foreign dummy+ (debenture/equity) i
where Y i is either the number of bank connections by company i or the number of interlocks company i has. 10 The sector dummies included for Brazil and Mexico differed because of the different diversification of their economies. For Brazil the controlled sectors are: agriculture and the coffee trade, banking, insurance, mining, manufacturing, railroads and utilities, and shipping and ports. For Mexico, the sectors included are manufacturing, mining, railroads and utilities, and banks. These sectors were included because there was complete data only for companies in those areas.
The foreign dummy in this case is capturing better access to capital, for three reasons. First, from the information contained in the Mexican Yearbook one could argue that foreign companies had a better corporate governance structure, e.g., most shareholders in foreign companies had one vote per share.
11 In addition, foreign companies had to follow the rules of their native countries and could be legally prosecuted there, so they had to abide to the chartering rules and the rule of law of their own countries. Finally, foreign companies had access to European and American markets of capital, so they could issue bonds and equity in different countries.
The database used for the analysis of this work was created with financial information from several sources. The Brazilian information comes mainly from the Brazilian Yearbook 1909. Since financial disclosure was regular in Brazil, the editors of this yearbook were able to publish many of the balance sheets of the companies they list.
Some information on bond issues had to be obtained from the annual reports of the Stock
Brokers Association of the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange (Relatório Anual da Câmara de Corretores de Fundos Públicos da Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro).
These reports also helped to complete the information on equity and year the company was established. 11 Authors like La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) have argued that one vote per share provisions in company statutes actually make it easier for minority shareholders to have a voice in company matters. According to their view better protections to small shareholders give more incentives for investors to participate in financial markets. Thus, one could argue that companies with statutes that protect small investors should have an easier time raising funds in stock markets. Figure 2 shows the corporate network of interlocks in Brazil in 1909. Given its size I do not include labels in the general picture, just to give a general idea of the structure of the network. Given that Brazil is an extended country, we would expect geographical distances undermined the capacity of directors to interlock among companies that were in distant geographical points. Nevertheless, the Brazilian corporate network extended all over the country. We find companies in Rio de Janeiro and São
IV. Findings
Graphical representations and density of the network
Paulo interlocking with companies in the states of Pernambuco and Bahia, in the northeast, and companies in Rio Grande do Sul, in the south. States has shown that bankers were very important in the network of corporate interlocks because they certified companies in financial markets. That is why when Mizruchi (1982) studied the centrality of banks within the network of interlocks of the largest U.S.
corporations in 1904 he found that, of the top 15 corporations, five were banks. Even more, the number of interlocks these banks had with other corporations was very high. National Bank of Commerce, the top-ranked bank, had 153 interlocks, and other banks had between 45 and 75 interlocks. These results bespeak about a system in which interlocks with banks were very important.
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In Mexico, the literature that has studied banking during the Porfirian period has attributed to bankers a central role in the network of corporate relations.
According to Maurer and Sharma (2001) and Maurer (2003) , close relations between banks and manufacturing companies helped to overcome information asymmetries and monitor borrowers. Mizruchi (1982) revealed the importance of the J.P. Morgan house in sending directors to the boards of different companies. Mizruchi undertook the task of identifying when a director of a corporation was actually an officer of a bank, sent to monitor and control the activities of that company. Unfortunately, this type of analysis cannot be performed for Mexico and Brazil. But for the United States this analysis shows J.P. Morgan as the most central actor in the network of corporate interlocks, followed by many other banks. Mizruchi found that the top 10 corporations were 1) J.P. Morgan & Co.; 2) Great Northern; 3) New York Life; 4) First National Bank (N.Y.); 5) International Harvester; 6) National City Bank; 7) U.S. Trust; 8)New York Trust; 9) Standard Oil; and, 10) U.S. Steel. (p. 66).
branches, issue more notes relative to reserves, and have its notes considered legal tender nationally (Ludlow and Marichal, 1986) . Table 4 presents the top companies in terms of betweenness centrality in Mexico.
Banks in Mexico City tended to be important brokers of information, credit, and influences within the system. Of the 15 most central corporations, seven were banks. In fact, when we look at the degree (number of interlocks) of each of the top actors, we find In Table 5 Table 6 presents the top companies in terms of betweenness centrality in Brazil.
When we look at the role of banks as brokers or intermediaries between network members using the betweenness measure of centrality, we find only two banks in the top 15 corporations. In fact, only one bank in the previous list appears again, the Banco do That the Banco de Recife in the northeast of Brazil was so central in the network should be expected according to the setup of financial markets in Brazil around 1909. We would expect to find that banks in regions far from the big financial centers had closer relations to companies. In those states banks were almost the only source of finance. Only large corporations could venture into the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange and issue debt.
In fact, the regional dimension is so strong that most of the clusters in the Brazilian network are related to geographical factors.
One could argue that the differences in the networks of Brazil and Mexico were explained by geographic factors. For instance, that in Brazil the large distances between the cities created a more dispersed network (with less interlocks) and complicating the interaction between companies and banks. Although I cannot fully reject the importance of geography, it plays less of an important role for the following reasons. First, I find that clusters with companies from the state of Minas Gerais (central part of Brazil) are adjacent and connected to the clusters that included firms and banks from Rio Grande do Sul (far south) and Rio de Janeiro (southeast). In a similar pattern, we find companies of geography cannot be the only factor influencing the network structure. Table 7 presents one way to test whether having more options for financing should make connections to banks less necessary for corporations in Brazil. It shows that companies that had a higher debenture-to-equity ratio (i.e., issued more bonds relative to equity) had fewer connections with banks on average. For example, in specification 2, an increase in the debenture-to-equity ratio by 100% implied having, on average, one less banker on its board of directors. This is a large number if we think that the average number of bankers on a board of directors for Brazil in 1909 was close to one and the median was zero. Actually, the maximum number of bank connections a company had was two. On the other hand, increases in debenture-to-equity ratios at the turn of the twentieth century went, many times, from zero to 100% or more. The legal limit for most companies was 100%, and railroad, port, shipping, and public works companies were allowed to issue debentures for more than their total equity.
Financial Markets vs. Banks: Financing options and reliance on bank connections?
Can we reproduce this result for the case of Mexico? In Mexico, financing options for companies were limited. Stock exchanges were not very developed around 1909, and most of the companies issuing bonds were foreign. In fact, the only two Mexican companies that had outstanding bond issues were two originally foreign railroad companies nationalized in 1903. For example, the average debenture-to-equity ratio of an issuing company in Mexico was 0.54. Thus, if we look at specification 5 of table 8, we find that a company issuing debentures would tend to have 22 more interlocks than the average Mexican company. Now, since most companies issuing debentures were foreign, we need to take into account the interaction between a debenture-issuing company and being foreign to see the net effect. In specification 6, we see that the average foreign company issuing debentures (with an average debenture/equity ratio of 0.5) would on average have six less interlocks.
This is the result of adding the three coefficients at the bottom of specification 6: (43.9-33.7)*0.5-10.85.
Therefore, companies in Brazil and Mexico with access to bond markets had, on average, less interlocks with banks. In Brazil, companies with access to bond markets had, on average, no interlocks with banks. In Mexico, foreign companies were the group that had access to other financing options and they had on average seven fewer interlocks with banks than domestic companies.
V. Conclusions
This Note: Dependent variable is number of bank connections per company in 1909. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% represented as *, **, and ***, respectively (standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent). Note: Dep. variable is number of number of bank connections and total interlocks per company in 1909. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% represented as *, **, and *** respectively (Standard Errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent).
